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Motivation
Honeypots
Traps set to detect attacks
Network traffic is monitored
Various host-based data are available
How can honeypots help the network security?
What are the targets of attack?
What are the intentions of attacker?
What are the possible counteractions?
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Used technologies
Honeypots
Both high-interaction and low-interaction
Various services opened – SSH, SMTP, HTTP...
Gathering of credentials from authentication attempts
NetFlow
Flow-based network monitoring
Widely used at Masaryk University
NetFlow collector NfSen
Honeyscan
Plugin for NfSen
Monitoring of honeypots
Incident detection and reporting
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Setup
Deployed at Masaryk University
Up to 320 million flows
a day
10–20 thousand flows
destined to honeypots
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Incident detection
Three types of incidents are detected and reported:
Type 1: Access to honeypots from protected network
Type 2: Massive access to honeypots and protected
network
Type 3: Authentication attempt against honeypot
Types 2 and 3 are reported only if the attacker has accessed
a host in production network apart from honeypots.
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Results
In Q1 2013 we have detected and reported:
1,100 security incidents caused by 830 unique IPs
Type 1: 13, 13 unique IPs
Type 2: 989, 738 unique IPs
Type 3: 98, 84 unique IPs
15,749 authentication attempts
SSH: 10,387
POP3: 4,719
FTP: 643
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Future work
Network funnel
Alternative to RTBH (Remotely-Triggered Black Hole)
Suspicious traffic is routed to honeypot segment
Spam traps
Mail servers or mail server emulators on honeypots
Dealing with spam as with the authentication attempts
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Conclusions
Both network-based and host-based data are used for
incident detection.
Incident detection method is complementory to existing
tools.
Tool for network monitoring of honeypots was developed
as a plugin for NfSen.
Plugin Honeyscan is deployed in Masaryk University
network.
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